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Abstract Research on embodied cognition stresses that
bodily and motor processes constrain how we perceive
others. Regarding action perception the most prominent
hypothesis is that observed actions are matched to the
observer’s own motor representations. Previous ﬁndings
demonstrate that the motor laws that constrain one’s per-
formance also constrain one’s perception of others’ actions.
The present neuropsychological case study asked whether
neurological impairments affect a person’s performance
and action perception in the same way. The results showed
that patient DS, who suffers from a frontal brain lesion, not
only ignored target size when performing movements but
also when asked to judge whether others can perform the
same movements. In other words DS showed the same
violation of Fitts’s law when performing and observing
actions. These results further support the assumption of
close perception action links and the assumption that these
links recruit predictive mechanisms residing in the motor
system.
Introduction
The assumption that the motor system supports cognition
has gained a lot of popularity in the last decade. It implies
that basic bodily and motor processes constrain not only
what individuals can perceive, feel, and do, but also how
they understand and relate to others (Sommerville &
Decety, 2006). One way to conceptualize motor contribu-
tions to perception and cognition is the assumption of
common coding (Prinz, 1997; Prinz & Hommel, 2002) that
is inspired by James (1890) ideomotor principle for vol-
untary action. This principle states that imagining an action
creates a tendency to carry it out. Common coding theory
extends the ideomotor principle and claims that the same
mental representations are involved in performing actions
and observing actions. These representations code the
‘‘perceivable’’ effect of actions. During performance
common codes are activated from the inside and then
further speciﬁed in the motor system. During observation
they are activated from the outside and lead to ‘‘motor
resonance’’.
A large body of neurophysiological evidence supports
the assumption of a common coding for perception and
action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons
found in the premotor cortex of the monkey brain and the
analogous mirror system in humans are engaged in per-
ception as well as in execution of action supporting the
view that others’ actions are coded in a functionally
equivalent way as one’s own actions. The primary function
of the common representations implemented in the mirror
system has so far been attributed to action understanding
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), that is, extracting the
goals that underlie observed actions (Wohlschlaeger &
Bekkering, 2002; Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Rizzolatti,
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).
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matching contributes to predicting others’ actions in real
time (Knoblich & Flach, 2001; Knoblich, Seigerschmidt,
Flach, & Prinz, 2002; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005).
Accordingly, simulation theories (Jeannerod, 2001; Wilson
& Knoblich, 2005; Schubotz, 2007) propose that people
use internal models (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan 1995;
Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000) to predict the future
sensory and perceptual consequences of observed actions.
The idea is that the same models that are used to plan one’s
own actions can be exploited in action perception.
In the context of action planning, internal models reﬂect
previously experienced relationships between actions and
their outcomes (Kawato, 1999; Miall, 2003; Wolpert
et al., 1995). With every motor command generated during
movement execution, the motor system produces an
efference copy of that motor command in parallel. Based
on this copy, the forward model estimates the sensory
consequences of the movement. The estimate stands in for
the re-afferent information coming from sensory channels
and is used in further processing until the actual re-afferent
information arrives at the central nervous system (e.g.,
Frith et al., 2000). The critical assumption in the simulation
accounts above is that forward models are instrumental in
action perception. Accordingly, an observed action is
matched with our own repertoire and is simulated via the
internal models using the same efference copy. In other
words, perception and action matching allows us to exploit
already existing predictive mechanisms in the motor
system to make sense of others’ actions.
In summary, ‘‘motor theories’’ of action perception
suggest that perceived actions are matched to one’s own
action repertoire and that this matching activates internal
models that allow one to predict the outcome of
perceived actions. One testable implication of these
assumptions is that the principles or ‘‘laws’’ that constrain
production of movement should affect action perception.
The reason is that motor simulations should impose the
constraints of one’s own motor apparatus onto observed
actors. Before describing a neuropsychological case study
on patient DS that further tested this claim we shortly
summarize earlier evidence that has been obtained with
regard to two well-established motor laws: The two-thirds
power law (Lacquaniti, Terzuolo, & Viviani, 1983) and
Fitts’s law (Fitts, 1954). In particular, we will focus on
results suggesting that these motor laws affect how we
perceive others.
Two-thirds power law
The two-thirds power law (Lacquaniti et al., 1983; Viviani,
2002) describes the relationship between the velocity of a
movement and the curvature of its trajectory. The law
states that as curvature increases one needs to systemati-
cally slow down. As the curvature decreases, on the other
hand, one can systematically accelerate the movement.
This change in velocity is directly proportional to the
change in curvature. The two-thirds power law has been
shown to hold for most types of human movement,
including manual (Viviani & Mounoud, 1990) or eye
tracking movements (de Sperati & Viviani, 1997). Studies
that investigated perceptual judgments for movements
indicate that the two-thirds power law constrains percep-
tion of action in the same way as it constrains production.
For example, it was shown that people’s perception of
geometric and kinematic properties of end-point trajecto-
ries, such as drawing and writing (Viviani & Stucchi, 1989,
1992), is systematically biased towards complying with the
two-thirds power law (Lacquaniti et al., 1983).
Further support comes from a recent functional MRI
study (Dayan et al., 2007) which investigated the neural
correlates of the two-thirds power law by presenting par-
ticipants visual stimuli that were either in compliance with
or in violation of this law. The authors found that the
stimuli obeying the two-thirds power law yielded stronger
and more widespread activation in areas associated with
action production, action perception and visual motion
processing.
Kandel, Orliaguet and Boe (2000) investigated whether
the two-thirds power law also inﬂuences an observer’s
ability to predict the future course of handwriting trajec-
tories. They found that the predictions were most accurate
for trajectories that complied with the law and became
less accurate as trajectories were manipulated to deviate
from it. Flach, Knoblich and Prinz (2004) reported similar
ﬁndings for a representational momentum paradigm
(Hubbard, 2005), where subjects are typically asked to
predict the future course of a movement. Errors in pre-
diction were smaller when the observed movement
trajectories complied with the two-thirds power law.
The results described above suggest that anticipating the
future course of a perceived movement is easier when it
corresponds to the constraints that govern the actions that
produce this movement. They can be interpreted as support
for the claim that we perceive and understand movements
through the lens of our motor repertoires. When perceived
events are predictable by an internal model in the motor
system people can better anticipate what will follow than
when the perceived events are not predictable by an
internal model.
Fitts’s law
Fitts’s law (Fitts, 1954) is perhaps the most stable law in
human motor control (for a review, see Plamondon &
Alimi, 1997), and has been studied extensively by the
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123human computer interaction (HCI) ﬁeld as well as
psychophysics. The law captures the speed accuracy trade-
off observed in human movement, and states that the
average time it takes to move between two targets is
determined by the width of the targets and the distance
separating them. With increasing target width, one can
move faster between the targets without missing them.
With increasing distance between targets, one takes longer
to move between them. Fitts’s law expresses this trade-off
between speed and accuracy as:
MT ¼ a þ b   ID;
where MT is movement time, ID is the index of difﬁculty,
and a and b are empirical constants. The critical variable is
the ID, which relates the amplitude (A) of the movement to
the width (W) of the targets. It is expressed as:
ID ¼ log2ð2A=WÞ
Themainquantitativepredictionthatcanbederivedfrom
Fitts’s law is that different combinations of target width and
movement amplitude can yield the same index of difﬁculty,
and thus the same MT (see Table 1 for examples). Fitts’s
law holds for many forms of movement production
including different effectors and movement contexts, with
only a few exceptions (e.g., Chi & Lin, 1997; Danion,
Duarte, & Grosjean, et al., 1999).
Decety and Jeannerod (1996) were the ﬁrst to demon-
strate that Fitts’s law not only holds for movements that are
actually performed but also for movements one imagines to
perform. They asked participants to imagine walking in a
three-dimensional virtual environment towards gates of
varying widths situated at varying distances and found that
the mental MT it took the participants to move between the
two gates was a linear function of the index of difﬁculty
(ID), just as predicted by Fitts’s law. The imagined MT
increased with increasing apparent distance between the
gates, and with decreasing gate width. This result shows
that imagined actions maintain the temporal characteristics
of the same actions executed (Decety, Jeannerod, & Pra-
blanc, 1989; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996), indicating that the
same internal models are at work when performing and
imagining actions.
There is also evidence that a person has implicit
knowledge of Fitts’s law when preparing for future
movements, when perceiving the constraints of planned
movements, and when evaluating the difﬁculty of planned
movements (Augustyn & Rosenbaum, 2005; Sirigu et al.,
1995, 1996; Maruff & Velakoulis, 2000; Slifkin & Grilli,
2006). Other motor imagery studies using a variety of
tasks, such as walking (Bakker, de Lange, Stevens,
Toni, & Bloem, 2007; Decety et al., 1989), simple hand
actions (Sirigu et al., 1996; Choudhury, Charman, Bird,
& Blakemore, 2007), drawing (Decety & Michel, 1989)o r
reaching targets (Maruff & Velakoulis, 2000) conﬁrm that
the same motor representations govern an action whether it
is real or imagined. Index of difﬁculty affects actions in the
same way irrespective of their modalities. Taken together,
similarity in temporal properties between real and imag-
ined movements (Decety & Jeannerod, 1996; Decety
& Michel, 1989) suggests that overlapping motor mecha-
nisms are recruited for both types of movement.
Results from another recent study suggest that obser-
vation of action may recruit similar motor processes as
performing and imagining movements. In particular,
Grosjean, Shiffrar and Knoblich (2007) have shown that
Fitts’s law holds when people are asked to judge how fast
another person can move. In this experiment, participants
were shown alternating pictures of a person moving their
arm between two targets. Index of difﬁculty (ID) was
varied choosing appropriate movement amplitudes and
target widths. Nine different amplitude/width combinations
were used, yielding three conditions for each of three IDs.
The participants were asked to report whether the person
could perform such a movement without missing the tar-
gets. Alternating pictures were chosen instead of video
clips to avoid any additional information provided by
movement trajectories. The perceived MTs were deﬁned in
terms of the speed at which the participants reported an
equal number of ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ judgments.
The perceived MTs were found to vary linearly as a
function of ID (r
2 = 0.96), indicating that the MTs did not
vary as a function of target width or movement amplitude
alone. These results demonstrated that the same motor law
constraining action production and motor imagery con-
strains action perception as well. Providing a solid support
for motor contributions to action perception, this study
reinforced the relationship between action production,
motor imagery and action perception, in line with evidence
for overlapping neural systems for these three motor
domains (Grezes & Decety, 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004).
The authors explain these results with the following
model (see Fig. 1) postulating that simulations are run via
two separate routes. One route deals with the contextual
information surrounding an action (task layout) and one
Table 1 Movement amplitudes (in cm) used in the experiment as a
function of the target width (in cm) and index of difﬁculty
Target width Index of difﬁculty
234
24 8 1 6
4 8 16 32
8 1 63 26 4
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123deals with the kinematics (spatiotemporal characteristics)
of the observed action. A representation of the task layout
constrains internal models towards simulating the action so
that it could be executed in that given environment (cf.
Pacherie, 2008). In other words, predicted speed (or MT)
for the movement depends on the context within which the
action is embedded and the biomechanical constraints
reﬂected in the internal models. In order to decide whether
an observed movement is doable or not, the speed pre-
diction is contrasted with the perceived movement speed.
The dynamic model of Erlhagen, Mukovskiy, & Bicho
(2006) suggests possible neural correlates of these separate
routes. In this model, simulation and action understanding
are integrated within a continuous dynamic process.
Accordingly, contextual information, movement informa-
tion, and the goal of the movement are represented as
dynamic activity in layered neural networks. One part of
the model consists of the premotor-parietal-STS (superior
temporal sulcus) mirror circuitry responsible for action
observation and action execution. This circuitry is inter-
connected with a layer in prefrontal cortex (PFC) that is
proposed to encode the intentional action goal framed by
the context in which the action is set.
If the contextual constraints in which actions are
embedded are processed by prefrontal areas, as claimed by
Erlhagen et al. (2006), then we would expect a lesion in this
area to misrepresent the context of an action, and hence the
reasons driving it. Particularly in a Fitts’s task, a patient
with a prefrontal lesion would not be able to integrate the
task layout into his representation of the observed move-
ment. This, in turn, would not only impair his ability to
adapt his movement speed but in the same manner his
ability to judge whether an observed person can achieve a
certain movement speed or not. In the following, we report a
study that tested this hypothesis in the neuropsychological
patient DS whose lesion encompasses the left frontal lobe.
Patient DS
DS is a 74-year-old former train inspector who suffered a
stroke in 1995. He is able to function at a relatively self-
sufﬁcient manner despite his hemiplegia of the right side.
Following his accident, a wide range of neuropsychological
measures and an MRI-scan of his lesion were obtained. His
MRI-scan revealed damage to the left inferior, middle and
superior frontal gyri (see Fig. 2). DS’s scores on low level
visual perception and object naming were relatively nor-
mal. He scored 100% on unusual views matching, and 86%
on naming everyday objects. Despite a few semantic errors
in naming, DS used these objects appropriately.
Method
Participants
In addition to patient DS, ﬁve healthy control participants
were tested in exchange for course credit or money. The
control participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. They were not age-matched as Fitts’s law has
been shown to hold across different age groups (Skoura,
Papaxanthis, Vinter, & Pozzo, 2005).
Materials
Material and apparatus
Stimulus presentation and response registration were
managed by an IBM compatible computer using E-Prime
software version 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).
Fig. 1 Proposed dual route model of action perception. Contextual
information and the kinematics of the observed actions are coded
independently via separate routes of internal simulations, The two
routes feed into and are reconciled by the predictors that yield a
judgment with respect to the doability of the perceived action
Fig. 2 MRI scans of patient DS. He suffers from lesions in left inferior middle and superior frontal gyri due to a stroke
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arm pointing at one of the two targets placed on a ﬂat
surface (see Fig. 3). The two targets were of identical
widths and were separated by varying amplitudes. Across
trials, each of three widths (2, 4 and 8 cm) was combined
with three of ﬁve amplitudes (4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 cm) to
make up for three IDs (2, 3 and 4; see Table 1). The pair of
photographs was repeatedly alternated to create apparent
motion.
Procedure and design
The rate at which the stimuli were alternated was set at 1
of 11 stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs), which also
corresponded to the durations of individual frames. SOAs
ranged from 150 to 650 ms in increments of 50 ms. Each
trial started at an SOA of either 150 or 650 ms. The SOAs
could be changed with key presses. Key [1] shortened the
SOA by one step, key [2] lengthened the SOA by one
step, and key [3] was programmed to go on to the next
trial. The task was to choose the speed at which the
movement between the two targets was just doable. The
participants could modify the SOAs as often as they
wanted until they were satisﬁed, before they moved on to
the next trial. The SOA that was ultimately chosen on a
given trial was deﬁned as the MT that was perceived as
just doable. A 3 (width) 9 3 (ID) 9 2 (hand) factorial
design was used. Half of the stimuli showed right-hand
movements and half showed left-hand movements. Each
block of 72 trials was presented to the participants in a
random order, following a short practice session. The
running time for each block was roughly 20 min, and
three blocks were completed.
The patient was also asked to execute the same actions
presented in the action perception task. Targets of same
widths as in the previous task were placed across each
other at varying amplitudes, to create the same IDs (see
Table 1). DS was instructed to move between the targets as
fast and as accurately as possible while a video camera
recorded his performance. Produced MT for a given trial
was deﬁned as the average duration of a single movement
between the targets, i.e., 10 s divided by the total number
of performed movements.
The patient could perform the task with his left hand
only, due to his hemiplegia. Each of the nine trial types was
tested twice. Trials were presented in a random order
within the same block. No control participants were tested
for this task, as Fitts’s law is well established in action
production across age groups (Skoura et al., 2005).
Results
Figure 4 presents the mean perceived MTs as a function of
widthandindexofdifﬁculty(ID),forpatientDSandtheﬁve
control participants. The results for the controls are consis-
tent with Fitts’s law and our previous ﬁndings (Grosjean
et al., 2007). Perceived MTs increased linearly with ID (see
bottom panel of Fig. 4). The regression analysis yielded a
signiﬁcant r
2 of 0.91 [F(1, 7) = 74.13, P\0.001] and the
following regression equation for MT: MT = 269 ? 48ID.
In contrast, the data for patient DS did not obey Fitts’s law
(see top panel of Fig. 4). ID only accounted for a small and
nonsigniﬁcant portion of the variance in DS’s perceptual
judgments [r
2 = 0.34, F(1, 7) = 3.61, P = 0.099]. The
resulting regression equation was MT = 219 ? 51ID.
Fig. 3 Sample stimuli with
different combinations of target
width (W) and movement
amplitude (A) leading to the
same index of difﬁculty (ID)
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123Figure 5 displays the same data plotted as a function of
movement amplitude (A), that is, distance between the
targets instead of ID. As can be seen in the top panel
of the ﬁgure, movement amplitude was an almost perfect
predictor for which MTs DS perceived as just doable, as
evidenced by the r
2 of 0.98 [F(1, 7) = 451.93, P\0.001.
The resulting regression equation was MT = 284 ? 4]. As
would be expected, based on the results presented above,
movement amplitude was a weaker predictor for the con-
trol participants’ performance (see bottom panel of Fig. 5)
because it fails to take into account the inﬂuence of W
[r
2 = 0.66, F(1, 7) = 13.83, P\0.01. The resulting
regression equation was MT = 371 ? 2A].
TheactionproductiondatagatheredfromDSaredepicted
in Fig. 6. As was already observed for his perceptual
data, movement amplitude [r
2 = 0.93, F(1, 7) = 93.44,
P\0.001, regression equation MT = 257 ? 3A; see bot-
tom panel of Fig. 6] proved to be a much better predictor of
his performance than ID [r
2 = 0.65, F(1, 7) = 13.03,
P\0.01, regression equation MT = 176 ? 46ID; see top
panel of Fig. 6]. Thus, both his perceptual and production
data violated Fitts’s law in similar ways: MT was linearly
related to movement amplitude rather than index of difﬁ-
culty. Finally, in line with what would be expected if DS
relied on a similar set of representations and/or processes in
both tasks, we found that his perceived and produced MTs
were almost perfectly correlated across conditions
[r
2 = 0.88, F(1, 7) = 50.34, P\0.001].
Discussion
The results clearly indicate that patient DS relies solely on
movement amplitude (the distance between two targets)
when judging whether a movement was doable or not, and
disregarded the target width. This suggests that DS seems
to have lost the ability to integrate contextual constraints in
Fig. 4 Mean perceived movement time as a function of target width
(W) and index of difﬁculty for patient DS (top panel) and the control
participants (bottom panel). The corresponding linear regression lines
and coefﬁcients of determination are also provided
Fig. 5 Mean perceived movement time as a function of target width
(W) and movement amplitude for patient DS (top panel) and the
control participants (bottom panel). The corresponding linear regres-
sion lines and coefﬁcients of determination are also provided
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an appropriate action speed for that given environment.
Consequently, the resulting speed prediction was solely
based on the amplitude of the movement. At the same time,
the performance data indicated exactly the same deﬁcit
when he was asked to move as quickly possible between
the two targets. This suggests that DS’s lesion affects his
performance and his perception of others’ movements in
the same way.
Although the control participants used in our study were
not age-matched, it is unlikely that DS’s results can be
attributed to general motor deterioration due to aging. First,
Skoura et al. (2005) demonstrated that Fitts’s law holds for
motor production in the elderly. Potentially troubling is
their ﬁnding that elderly participants disregarded varying
target widths during the motor imagery task (but not the
motor production task). This ﬁnding seems to converge
with the present result that patient DS disregarded width. It
has to be kept in mind, however, that index of difﬁculty
accounts for a much lesser amount of variance in DS’s
doability judgments for perceived movements, than it
accounted for in the motor imagery condition (r
2 = 0.34
and 0.89, respectively) in Skoura et al.’s study on elderly
participants. These numbers seem to rule out the possibility
that patient DS’s selective impairment is merely a
by-product of aging.
It should also be noted that Skoura et al., attribute the
violation of Fitts’s law in imagined movements to the aging
parietal cortex. Sirigu et al. (1996) similarly found that
patients with parietal lesions violated Fitts’s law in the
same domain (motor imagery). The possibility has to be
acknowledged that patient DS’s diffuse lesion in the frontal
lobe might encompass this area’s links with the adjacent
parietal lobe and result in his selective disregard to
the target widths. Importantly, however, both mentioned
studies found that parietal impairment did not yield to
violation of Fitts’s law in action production, but only in
motor imagery. In contrast, patient DS violated Fitts’s law
in both of the tested action domains. Therefore, his parallel
impairment in action production and action perception
cannot be attributed to a potential injury in his parietal
cortex.
The dynamic model outlined by Erlhagen et al. (2006)
provides a plausible explanation to patient DS’s data. In
this model the mirror circuitry (i.e. superior temporal sul-
cus, inferior parietal lobule and the inferior frontal gyrus)
performs the matching of observed actions with the exist-
ing motor repertoire. The PFC, on the other hand, acts as
the ‘goal layer’ (ibid. p. 177) and encodes the goal of the
observed action, which is constrained by the action context.
In DS’s case, the PFC cannot perform this function and the
matching process between perception and action proceeds
orthogonally to the action context.
Conclusions
The results of the present study clearly indicate that DS’
data are best understood as reﬂecting a speciﬁc deﬁcit that
is caused by a brain lesion that affect action production and
action perception in exactly the same way. When presented
with a Fitts’s like task, DS’s ‘doability’ judgments for
observed movements were found to be a direct function of
the distance between targets. Remarkably, DS’s produced
movements slowed down as this distance increased,
indicating that in both cases patient DS exhibited a spe-
ciﬁc disability to integrate target size into his motor
representation.
Fig. 6 Mean produced movement time as a function of target width
(W) and index of difﬁculty (top panel) and movement amplitude
(bottom panel) for patient DS. The corresponding linear regression
lines and coefﬁcients of determination are also provided
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adults has demonstrated that difﬁculty of a movement
(reﬂected in MT) is a function of the target width and the
distance between the target pair. In line with the dynamic
model proposed by Erlhagen, we attribute this speciﬁc
deﬁcit in DS to his lesion of the prefrontal lobe that pre-
cludes inﬂuences of the task layout on motor simulation.
Although DS still perceives others’ action capabilities
through the lens of his own motor repertoire, the brain
systems encoding task context are dysfunctional and can
therefore not inform the simulations. This is not to say that
all inﬂuences on motor simulations are top-down. Previous
research has shown that the lack of peripheral (bottom-up)
input to the body schema can also lead to difﬁculties in
action observation and action understanding (Bosbach,
Cole, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2005; Bosbach, Knoblich, Reed,
Cole, & Prinz, 2006).
Patient DS is yet another illustration of how mechanisms
governing action performance constrain what is perceived
to be ‘doable’ in others. In functional terms this suggests a
common coding of perception and action that allows
perceived actions to be matched to one’s own action
capabilities (Prinz, 1997). Once common codes are acti-
vated the motor system runs simulations to predict the
likely future of the ongoing actions that are being observed,
thereby directly serving perception. The use of such
simulations, which are evidently contingent upon the
observer’s motor repertoire, renders perception a function
of motor processes.
Simulations in general can be deﬁned as partial recre-
ations of previously experienced perceptual as well as
motor states (Barsalou, 2008). They serve as the means
through which we anticipate the world around us thereby
allowing for further mental processing. This emphasizes
the neglected ﬂipside of the bidirectional link between
bodily and mental states and offers us a plausible expla-
nation as to how our interactions with the world ground
cognition.
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